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Abstract 
This paper reviews major differences between the accounting regulatory systems 
in Canada and the United States. In the U.S., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
governs responsibilities of management, auditors, and Boards of Directors related 
to internal control over financial reporting. In Canada, a series of Multilateral 
Instruments under provincial jurisdiction serves similar objectives. As compared to 
the U.S., the Canadian system is more decentralized and principles-based 
allowing a greater degree of responsibility to the accounting profession for 
standard setting and oversight. The Canadian approach has resulted in weaker 
regulation, slower implementation, and greater influence by the accounting 
profession. These findings imply that accounting regulations should be tailored to 
fit the political and institutional structures of the adopting country. 
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The New Age of Accounting Regulation in Canada and the United States: 
Divergent Paths or Parallel Tracks? 
Introduction 
Prominent business scandals in the early 2000' s, such as those involving Enron and WorldCom, 
resulted in loss of confidence in the business community and the accounting profession. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (US Congress, 2002) was a major U S regulatory response in order to 
improve corporate governance and to regain corporate credibility and investor confidence. 
Canadian companies that trade on U S stock exchanges and Canadian subsidiaries of U S 
companies must also comply with SOX. In addition, Canadian securities regulators introduced 
similar requirements for Canadian public companies (Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), 
2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2006). Furthermore, some private companies and public and non-
profit organizations have also strengthened their internal control to enhance their reputations as 
responsible and credible organizations. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is one of the best known accounting regulations. It governs the 
responsibilities of management, auditors, and Boards of Directors in ensuring effective control 
over financial reporting by public companies. The Act established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board ( P C A O B ) with broad powers to regulate auditing and auditors: for 
example, to set auditing standards, to enforce compliance with the Act, to investigate violations, 
and to impose sanctions (PCAOB, 2004). The most extensive requirements of S O X are those in 
Section 404, which requires senior management to establish and maintain adequate internal 
control over financial reporting, assess the effectiveness of control, and certify and report the 
conclusions of these assessments. In addition, it requires independent auditors to certify and 
report on the adequacy of management's internal control assessments.The Canadian regulations 
are similar to SOX, but notable differences also exist. Securities regulation in Canada falls under 
provincial jurisdiction under the Canadian Constitution.1 The Canadian Securities Administrators 
(CSA) worked with provincial administrators and legislators to enact regulations stipulated in the 
revised Multilateral Instrument, M I 52-109, now effective in all provinces (CSA, 2006). In 
contrast to SOX, reporting can be done in conjunction with management discussion and analysis 
( M D & A ) in the financial statements, and separate reports are not required. In addition, auditor 
certification of management control assessments is not required at all (CSA, 2005c, 2006). 
Although the Canadian regulations are somewhat weaker than S O X , once fully implemented, 
they require equal effort on the part of management to implement internal control and systems, 
and to assess and report control effectiveness. 
As neighbouring countries with similar history, language, and culture, Canada and the US could 
be expected to have very similar regulations and approaches to regulation. Although this may be 
true to a degree, significant differences are found in accounting regulation in the two countries. 
This paper reviews the major differences and their implications for the major players It 
specifically uses the recent and extensive regulation of internal control over financial reporting 
required by S O X and by Canadian regulations as the main example. It contributes to the 
accounting literature and practice by highlighting that different approaches have been used and 
are useful, in accounting regulation and standard setting in different jurisdictions These 
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experiences can help other jurisdictions implement and improve their regulations, systems, and 
processes, as well as aid academics to refine theory in this relatively new and under-researched 
area. Specific areas examined include: theories of accounting regulation; major regulators of 
accounting; differences in major accounting regulations; differences in roles for boards of 
directors, management, and auditors; and differences in accounting regulation strategies. 
However, it should be noted that these regulations are complex in both countries and involve 
both accounting and legal professions, as well as multiple levels of government and other 
agencies. Therefore, a full discussion of the regulations is not possible; nonetheless, some key 
examples are provided to highlight such complexities. 
Theories and Strategies of Accounting Regulation and Standard Setting 
The justification of and the strategies for enacting accounting regulations and setting accounting 
standards are similar to those for other legislation and regulations. Gaffikin (2005) argued that 
accounting regulations cannot be considered in isolation but need to be viewed within the 
broader legal frameworks and systems for different countries. Regulation can arise from three 
primary sources: market, governmental legislators and regulators, and the accounting 
profession.2 In some cases, more or less independent agencies, for example S E C and P C A O B in 
the U S and the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) and the Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Oversight Council ( A A S O C ) in Canada, have also been established to carry out 
various regulatory and enforcement activities. The relative strengths and powers of these parties 
can vary in different countries, depending on the prevailing economic, social, political, and 
ideological conditions, and the existing institutions and systems (Puxty, Willmott, Cooper, and 
Lowe, 1987). Consequently, the approaches taken and the regulations themselves are expected to 
vary among different countries even with advanced market-based economies. 
Regulation has often been justified using the concept of information asymmetry, based on 
economic principles (Gaffikin, 2005).3 One form of information asymmetry, called adverse 
selection, implies that some parties to a business transaction have internal information that other 
parties do not have. A s such, they may have an unfair advantage and can take action for their 
own personal economic benefit (Scott, 2006). Regulation that prohibits certain actions and 
activities, or requires disclosure of them, presumably helps level the playing field for all parties. 
For example, securities regulations to prevent insider trading by corporate executives further this 
objective. Another form of information asymmetry, called moral hazard, is based on the premise 
that the parties to a business transaction, whose actions cannot be observed by other parties, can 
shirk their duties (Scott, 2006). For example, as shareholders cannot directly observe the actions 
of corporate executives in managing the corporation on their behalf, executives can neglect to 
take action that is in the best interests of shareholders. In these situations, incentive contracts can 
be designed to promote desired behaviours, and measures, such as the net income and share 
price, used to assess managerial effort. However, as both can be manipulated by management, 
regulation m a y still be required to minimize opportunities for and to detect manipulation. 
It has also been argued that theories based on economic principles can provide only limited 
explanations for regulation, and that regulation is as much, if not more, a political;activi^ , as an 
economic activity (Scott, 2006). Three politically-motivated theones Bit public interest theory, 
interest group theory, and institutional theory. Public interest theory posits that regulation 
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required to protect public interests, given imperfect market mechanisms, and that regulators 
operate to maximize social welfare. Market forces are unable to adequately control the amount 
and type of regulation and accounting information supplied and demanded, as both are public 
goods 4 The providers may be reluctant to produce appropriate information and the users unable 
or unwilling to pay the true cost of information (Scott, 2006). In addition, the "public" is not a 
homogeneous group with uniform interests and demands for regulation (Gaffikin, 2005), and 
such interests can change over time (Day, 2001). Instead, it consists of groups of individuals with 
common interests, but interests that are different from, and often conflicting with, those of other 
groups (Baker, 2005). The interest group theory posits that special interest groups lobby the 
regulators for their own benefit (Van Lent, 1997). Furthermore, regulatory bodies, standard 
setters, and accounting firms themselves are special interest groups with their o w n power 
positions and interests in mind (Hirshleifer, 1976; Puro, 1984; Rahman, Ng, and Tower, 1994; 
Scott, 2006).5 Therefore, determining the right type and amount of regulation is difficult, if not 
impossible, and regulations often represent majority consensus or compromises among 
conflicting interests, instead of ideal or optimum solutions. Furthermore, Day (2001) and 
Gilfedder and 6 hOgartaigh (2001) described the lack of user participation and the 
overrepresentation of large preparers of financial statements and accounting firms in setting 
accounting standards. Although the interest group theory may be more appropriate than the 
public interest theory for describing accounting regulation and standard setting (Scott, 2006), it is 
not sufficient in itself, without considering the broader social context (Tinker, 1984; Gaffikin, 
2005). The institutional theory, which posits that regulation is shaped more by social and 
organizational settings than by individual or group interests (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Tinker, 
1984), may be more useful for explaining recent developments in accounting regulation. 
Countries have adopted different strategies or approaches to accounting regulation and setting 
standards. Baldwin and Cave (1999) identified eight strategies of regulation, with four being 
possibly applicable to accounting regulation: command-and-control regulation, self-regulation, 
incentives-based regulation, and disclosure regulation. In the command-and-control strategy, the 
regulator establishes acceptable activities, rules, procedures, and standards; enforces compliance; 
and imposes penalties for violations. The regulation of securities markets in the U S by S E C 
exhibits strong characteristics of this strategy. Self-regulation relies on professional bodies to 
establish rules, procedures, and standards for their members, and to develop systems for 
monitoring and enforcing them. This is a typical strategy for setting accounting standards in 
many countries, Canada being a good example. Incentives-based regulation provides financial or 
non-financial incentives to achieve desired policy objectives on a voluntary compliance basis 
without excessive rules. Providing tax credits, guidelines, and other support mechanisms to 
encourage voluntary adoption of desirable activities are examples of this strategy. Penalties for 
non-compliance with securities regulations can also serve as negative incentives and promote 
compliance. Disclosure regulation strategy involves requirements for the disclosure of certain 
information, for example, extensive disclosures of financial and operational information under 
the securities regulations. Each strategy poses specific strengths and weaknesses from the 
perspectives of different stakeholders, which must be carefully balanced by the regulator. 
The basic strategies or approaches to accounting regulation and accounting standard setting have 
been categorized as either the Anglo-American approach or the continental approach The 
Anglo-American approach is characterized by: 
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[A] strong accounting profession, a somewhat limited role of government the 
importance of securities markets for raising equity capital, and an emphasis upon 
the true and fair view of audited financial statements [emphasis originall (Wolk 
Tearney, andDodd (2001), p. 715).6 U ^ 
On the other hand, the continental approach relies on a relatively weak accounting profession 
strong governmental influence on accounting regulation, and emphasis on debt financing instead 
of equity capital. Major characteristics of the Anglo-American approach are evident, for 
example, in the U S , U K , Canada, and Australia; whereas the continental approach is dominant in 
France, Germany, and Japan (Wolk et al., 2001).7 Major characteristics of the continental model 
are also exhibited in Italy, Spain, and Greece (Di Pietra, McLeay, and Riccaboni, 2001; Blake 
and Amat Salas, 2001; Ballas, Hevas, and Neal, 2001). In particular, Di Pietra et al. (2001) 
described Italian accounting regulation to be firmly political and legislative. However, there has 
been significant convergence of the two approaches during the past few years in response to the 
globalization of business and capital markets. For example, greater private-sector and 
professional influence in setting accounting standards has been noted in France and Austria, two 
continental countries, bringing them closer to the Anglo-American approach (Merkl-Davies, 
2004; Colasse and Standish, 2004). While income manipulation or "creative accounting" has 
traditionally been associated with the Anglo-American model, Blake and Amat Salas (2001) 
provided examples of it also in Spain, with a more continental approach. O n the other hand, 
greater legislative and regulatory control has emerged in the U S and Canada, as is demonstrated 
in this paper, moving them somewhat closer to the continental model.8 Nonetheless, this paper 
presents evidence that this classification may be too simplistic and that significant differences 
also persist between the standards and standard-setting approaches within the Anglo-American 
group, namely Canada and the U S . 
Accounting Regulators in Canada and the US 
Both legislators and professional accounting bodies play important roles, although in somewhat 
different capacities and proportions, in establishing and overseeing accounting regulations in 
Canada and the U S . The roles of major regulatory agencies are discussed in this section and 
summarized in Table 1. 
[Table 1] 
In both Canada and the US, professional accounting bodies serve important functions in 
establishing and regulating accounting standards. In Canada, the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA), through its three boards, conducts research into current business issues and 
sets accounting, auditing, and assurance standards. The Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) sets 
accounting and reporting standards for profit-oriented and non-profit organizations. The Public 
Sector Accounting Standards Boards (PSAB) sets accounting and reporting standards for federal, 
provincial, and local governments and boards. The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(AASB) sets auditing and assurance standards for all sectors. In the US , the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has a mission similar to that of CICA. F A S B establishes 
and improves financial accounting and reporting standards for the private sector and the federal 
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independent of the influence of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As expressed 
by Zeff (1995): 
The SEC's accounting staff has kept a close watch over the issues, agendas 
priorities, and the tentative positions of the [accounting] standard setter, and has 
not been reluctant to intervene with its views . . (Zeff, 1995, p. 56). 
Without question, the agendas of the successive [accounting] standard setters and 
many of their pronouncements have been powerfully shaped by the signals 
emanating from the SEC (Zeff, 1995, p. 61). 
In the US the SEC regulates and oversees securities markets and enforces securities legislation, 
notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002).9 S O X has been considered to be "the most 
significant piece of securities legislation since the 1930s" (Whitestone, 2005, p. 382), notably 
since the Securities Act (US Congress, 1933) and the Securities Exchange Act (US Congress, 
1934). The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ( P C A O B ) was created under S O X as 
an oversight agency. Its major mandate is inspecting and registering public accounting firms that 
prepare audit reports for public companies. P C A O B can establish, adopt, or modify auditing, 
quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards for public company audits. However, 
these standards must be approved by SEC (SEC, 2007). P C A O B enforces compliance with SOX, 
its own rules, professional standards, and securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance 
of audit reports and the related obligations and liabilities of accountants. It is also charged with 
investigating registered companies for potential violations of applicable rules relating to audits 
and imposing sanctions for violations. In order to facilitate reporting and enforcement, 
particularly in smaller companies, SEC recently agreed to coordinate the enforcement of some 
key areas of S O X with P C A O B (SEC, 2007). 
In Canada, securities regulation is within provincial jurisdiction.10 Securities regulators from 
each province have joined to form the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). C S A is 
primarily responsible for developing a harmonized approach to securities regulation across 
Canada.11 Oversight functions similar to those of P C A O B are handled by several different 
oversight agencies. The Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) is an independent non-
profit organization, established in 2002 by CSA, CICA, and the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (OSFI). Under CPAB, C A firms engaged in public company audits must 
undergo more frequent and rigorous inspections, implement new Canadian auditor independence 
rules, adopt second partner reviews of all public company audits, and establish new quality 
control standards. The Accounting Standards Oversight Council (AcSOC) oversees activities of 
the Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) and the Public Sector Accounting Board (PSAB). In 
addition, the Auditing and Assurance Standards Oversight Council ( A A S O C ) was established in 
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2002 to oversee the activities of the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AASB) A A S O C 
provides input strategic direction, and user perspective into setting auditing and assurance 
standards. At the provincial level, the Province of Ontario has played a leading role in securities 
regulation (Cox, 2004), and created the Public Accountants Council (PAC) in 2005 to set 
standards for public accounting and to certify that professional accounting bodies in Ontario 
meet these standards. 
In summary, accounting regulation and oversight in the US tend to be more centralized 
emphasizing the role of S E C and P C A O B . O n the other hand, the Canadian system relies on both 
professional and legislative approaches. C P A B is funded by accounting firms and it is not 
subject to any regulatory oversight. In addition, a disproportionately large number of C P A B 
members are accountants, resulting in some questioning of its independence (Pritchard and Puri, 
2006). C I C A and its boards also play key roles both in standard-setting and oversight functions.' 
Even on the legislative and enforcement front, a great deal of voluntary collaboration is 
necessary among the provinces to reach a national-level consensus and to enact uniform 
legislation for each province. Pritchard and Puri (2006) concluded that Canada relies largely on 
self-regulation, whereas the U S relies almost exclusively on government regulation. Considering 
the fragmented regulatory system in Canada, Whitestone (2005) argued that it is difficult for 
regulators to pursue fraud charges and for individual investors to take legal action against 
companies. 
Accounting Regulations in Canada and the US 
Canadian accounting regulations for internal control over financial reporting bear some marked 
similarities to S O X , as they were modelled after S O X , but notable differences also exist. In 
addition, the regulations in both countries are still a work in progress after several years of 
planning and implementation. The major differences in the structure of the relevant Canadian 
and U S regulations are outlined in Table 2. 
[Table 2] 
In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) provides the legislative basis for internal control 
regulation. It establishes the responsibilities of management, auditors, and Boards of Directors 
for effective control over financial reporting by public companies. The most extensive 
requirements of S O X are those found in Section 404, which require senior management (CEO 
and C F O ) to establish and maintain adequate internal control over financial reporting, assess the 
effectiveness of internal control, and certify and report the conclusions of these assessments. In 
addition, it requires independent auditors to certify and report on the adequacy of management's 
internal control assessments. While S O X is U S legislation, Canadian and other foreign 
companies that trade on U S stock exchanges must also comply with these regulations. Large U S 
companies ('accelerated' filers with market value of common equity of at least $75 million), 
have already had to comply with both management and auditor certification requirements for 
fiscal years ending after November 14, 2004 (SEC, 2004). The compliance deadlines for small 
US companies and for foreign companies have been extended several times (SEC, 2005). 
According to the latest announcement (SEC, 2006), small U S and foreign companies ('non-
accelerated' filers with market value of less than $75 million) have to comply for fiscal years 
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ending after December 14, 2007 for management certification and December 14, 2008 for 
auditor certification. Large foreign companies have to comply for fiscal years ending after July 
14, 2006 for management certification, and July 14, 2006 (if market value is at least $700 
million) or July 14, 2007 (if market value is between $75 and $700 millions) for auditor 
certification. All new U S and foreign public companies have to comply commencing for the 
second year of their operations. 
The main Canadian regulations for internal control over financial reporting are articulated in 
Multilateral Instrument 52-109, applicable to all publicly listed Canadian companies in all 
provinces, except investment funds and companies that comply with similar certification 
requirements under S O X (CSA, 2004a, 2006).12 After considerable collaboration among 
provincial legislators and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), the instrument was 
ratified in all jurisdictions. Consistent with SOX, it calls for management certification of the 
design and operating effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. The design 
certification requirements become effective for years ending after June 29, 2006, and the 
effectiveness certification requirements are proposed for years ending after June 29, 2008 (CSA, 
2006, 2007a). Such reporting can be accomplished as a component of management discussion 
and analysis ( M D & A ) in financial statements, as compared to a separate component in annual 
reports that is required for SOX. Contrary to SOX, auditor certification of management control 
assessments is not required at all in the revised M I 52-109 (although it had initially been 
proposed in M I 52-111) (CSA, 2005c, 2006). In its guidance-providing role, CICA has also 
issued guidelines to help small companies implement internal control requirements, following 
similar previously released guidelines intended for management and directors (Goodfellow and 
Willis, 2007, 2006a, 2006b). 
Although the ink was barely dry on the above-discussed US and Canadian regulations, proposals 
for further modifications have already been presented in both countries.13 In the US, P C A O B 
released the Audit Standard No. 5 to replace the Standard No. 2 (PCAOB, 2007). The new 
standard aims to streamline audits of internal control over financial reporting by focusing on the 
most important controls and by eliminating unnecessary audit procedures and details and to 
scale aud.ts based on company size. There is still also a possibility for further compliance 
extensions for small U S and foreign companies, depending on the availability of appropriate and 
timely guidance. In Canada, standards addressing public accountants' responsibilities in 
conducting audits of internal control over financial reporting, which are based on agreed-upon 
procedures with no assurance provided, were adopted in the Assurance Handbook in April 2007 
ftandJ Thf? ?. V0 ^V*1' Canadian auditinS Standards based ™ the new US 
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general is more principles-based than the U S approach, which tends to be more rules-based 
although P C A O B claims the Audit Standard No. 5 to be more principles-based than the Standard 
No. 2. Due to these factors, significant differences in regulations and standards could be 
expected. Canada has generally adopted a 'wait-and-see' approach and mirrored its regulations 
and standards on those of the U S . T w o notable differences in the Canadian requirements are the 
more streamlined reporting requirements and the lack of auditor certification requirement for 
management's control assessments. These differences result in greater responsibility by the 
management of Canadian companies for internal control over financial reporting. 
Responsibilities of Management, Auditors, and Boards of Directors 
In implementing internal control regulations, the Boards of Directors and their audit committees, 
management, and auditors play important roles. Such roles vary in the U S and Canadian systems. 
The main responsibilities of the three parties are discussed in this section and summarized in 
Table 3. 
[Table 3] 
In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), Section 301 establishes requirements relating to the audit 
committee's responsibilities. It covers issues such as selecting, compensating, retaining, and 
overseeing independent audit firms; ensuring the independence of audit committee members; 
establishing procedures for handling confidential and anonymous complaints regarding 
accounting, internal control, and auditing; and engaging advisors. In addition, Section 201 
specifies non-audit services that would impair auditor independence; Section 202 deals with the 
pre-approval of audit and non-audit services by the audit committee and the disclosure of audit 
fees; and Section 203 limits the term of contracts for audit services to no more than five 
consecutive years. Furthermore, Section 406 requires a company to disclose whether it has 
adopted a code of ethics that applies to the company's principal executive officer, principal 
financial officer, principal accounting officer, and controller, and if not, to explain why. As a 
final example, Section 303 prohibits officers and directors, and persons acting under their 
direction, from taking actions to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead the 
auditor for the purpose of rendering the financial statements materially misleading. 
In Canada, the audit committee's responsibilities are set out in Multilateral Instrument (MI) 52-
110 (CSA, 2004b). It is concerned with appointing and overseeing external auditors; reviewing 
financial statements, M D & A , and earnings press releases before their publication; establishing 
procedures for handling anonymous complaints on accounting, internal control, and auditing 
matters; and approving policies aimed at ensuring auditor independence. For example, M I 52-
110 requires each public company to have an audit committee with a minimum of three 
members, to require the external auditor to report directly to the audit committee, and to disclose 
the names of the audit committee members and whether the members are independent and 
financially literate. In addition, the National Policy (NP) 58-201 (CSA, 2005b) deals with 
ensuring integrity of chief officers, establishing a culture of integrity throughout the company, 
identifying principal risks, and ensuring appropriate systems to manage risks. The Canadian 
requirements for risk management are interesting in that risk management has typically been 
considered to be a management function, instead of a governance function, and in that S O X does 
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not have explicit corresponding requirements. The establishment and enforcement of 
professional integrity and conduct standards in Canada is primarily the responsibility of C I C A 
(CICA, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007). 
The responsibilities of management are very similar under both the US and Canadian regulatory 
systems. The Canadian requirements are stipulated in the Multinational Instrument (MI) 52-109 
(CSA, 2006) and the U S requirements in Sections 302 and 404 of S O X . In both cases, the C E O 
and the C F O must certify that the financial statements do not contain material misstatements and 
omissions, that adequate disclosure control and internal control over financial reporting exist, 
and that they are responsible for designing and maintaining such controls.15 They must also 
evaluate the effectiveness of internal control and report their conclusions, along with any 
material changes in internal control and their effects. The main difference between the Canadian 
and the U S requirements is that this reporting can be accomplished as part of the management 
discussion and analysis ( M D & A ) accompanying financial statements in Canada, whereas 
separate disclosures in the financial reports are required in the U S . 
As to the auditor's responsibilities, SOX (Sec. 404) requires a company's auditors to attest to, 
and report on, the internal control assessments made by management. This attestation is to be 
made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued by P C A O B . The auditor 
must also report certain matters to the audit committee, including critical accounting policies, 
alternative accounting treatments the auditor has discussed with management, the ramifications 
of alternative treatments, and the treatment preferred by the auditor (Sec. 204). There is no audit 
requirement for management's internal control assessment reports in Canada. However, the 
Assurance Handbook (CICA, 2007, Sec. 5751) establishes standards for auditor communication 
with the audit committee in general on matters arising from financial statement audits, and the 
new Section 9110, effective M a y 1, 2007, addresses public accountants' responsibilities 
specifically in conducting reviews of internal control over financial reporting and the form and 
content of such reports (CICA, 2006, 2007). 
In summary, the management of public companies in both Canada and the US is responsible for 
similar core requirements for internal control over financial reporting in that it must establish and 
maintain proper internal control procedures in order to ensure timely, reliable, and effective 
financial reporting. Roles of audit committees are also comparable and involve overseeing the 
external auditor, ensuring the independence of the external auditor and audit committees, and 
designing appropriate processes for handling confidential complaints.16 In addition to audit 
committees, the Boards of Directors of Canadian public companies are required to identify major 
risks and to establish appropriate risk management strategies and practices. One key difference in 
the Canadian approach is a significantly reduced formal role for independent auditors as no 
certification of management's internal control assessments is required. Another major difference 
is the significantly more prominent role of professional accounting bodies, that is, C I C A and its 
boards, in setting professional independence and integrity standards in Canada In the U S these 
issues are regulated by S O X and the standards set by P C A O B 
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Accounting Regulation Strategies in Canada and the U S 
As discussed in Section 2, various countries have adopted different strategies for accounting 
regulation. In this section, strategies adopted in Canada and the U S are compared and the extent 
of their usage summarized in Table 4. Baldwin and Cave's (1999) general categorization of 
regulation strategies is modified, as applicable to accounting regulation. Of the eight strategies 
identified by Baldwin and Cave, four strategies could apply to accounting regulation: command-
and-control regulation, self-regulation, disclosure regulation, and incentives-based regulation 
The command-and-control and self-regulation approaches are viewed as opposite core 
approaches, and the other two can be used to supplement either one. The degree to which these 
strategies are used in each country is evaluated as extensive, moderate, or minimal, and examples 
of relevant legislation and regulations are provided. Although this assessment may'involve some 
subjective judgment, it illustrates some interesting contrasts in accounting regulation strategies 
adopted in the two countries. 
[Table 4] 
The main strategy of accounting regulation in the US has been the command-and-control 
strategy. This strategy has been used extensively, for example, through more centralized control 
over securities regulation granted to S E C by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act 
(US Congress, 1996), and particularly to S E C and P C A O B by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
PCAOB's authority to set auditing standards and to inspect public auditing firms clearly 
diminishes the self-regulatory authority of the accounting profession. Heavy penalties for non-
compliance are another manifestation of the command-and-control strategy. S O X (Sec. 1106) 
increased m a x i m u m penalties in the Securities Exchange Act (US Congress, 1934) for willful 
provision of false or misleading information by corporate executives; fines for up to $5,000,000, 
and/or imprisonment for up to 20 years. S O X (Sec. 802 and 807) provides for fines and/or 
maximum imprisonment for knowingly falsifying documents and for defrauding shareholders for 
up to 20 and 25 years, respectively. The new sweeping powers of S E C and P C A O B under SOX, 
along with the rules-based approach to setting standards, demonstrate extensive use of the 
command-and-control strategy and reduce self-regulation of the accounting profession to a 
moderate level. 
While the command-and-control strategy is also evident in Canada17, the extent of its use can be 
characterized as only moderate. Although the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) 
facilitated the development of c o m m o n provincial regulation—particularly Multilateral 
Instrument M I 52-109—the provinces and their securities regulators are responsible for 
enactment and enforcement. M I 52-109 does not address penalties, leaving them to provincial 
regulators (CSA, 2004a). However, the C S A Staff Notice 57-302 stipulates that companies 
failing to file internal control assessment certificates in accordance with M I 52-109 may be 
subject to "cease trade" orders (CSA, 2004c), depending on the jurisdiction.18 In addition, the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and oversight boards—all heavily staffed by 
accountants—are primarily responsible for the development and enforcement of auditing 
standards and rules of professional conduct in Canada, although provincial securities 
commissions and stock exchanges also have their o w n rules of conduct. Given the more 
principles-based approach to setting accounting and auditing standards, the accounting 
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profession in Canada still has extensive self-regulatory capacity. Therefore, the use of the 
command-and-control strategy in Canada is considered to be moderate, and the use of self-
regulation extensive. 
Both countries use disclosure regulation, but the US does so somewhat more extensively than 
Canada. For example, Multilateral Instrument M I 58-101 requires disclosure of corporate 
governance practices established in National Policy N P 58-201 (CSA, 2005b, 2005e), and 
Multilateral Instrument M I 52-110 requires disclosure of education, experience, independence, 
and financial literacy of audit committee members (CSA, 2004b). Similar issues are addressed in 
Sections 406 and 407 of SOX. Section 406 requires disclosure of whether companies have 
adopted a code of ethics applicable to chief executive and financial officers and controllers, and 
if not, to explain why not. Section 407 requires disclosure of whether the audit committee has at 
least one financial expert and whether this member is independent. In addition, Section 202 
requires disclosure of audit and non-audit services performed by the auditor. Non-audit services 
must have been pre-approved by the audit committee. Furthermore, the Section 404 core 
disclosure requirements for internal control over financial reporting are stronger than those in M I 
52-109, as auditor certification of management's control assessments is not required in Canada. 
Therefore, the use of disclosure regulation is classified as moderate in Canada and moderate-
extensive in the US. 
As regulators in both countries have used the first three strategies at least moderately, they have 
not relied extensively on incentives-based regulation. A n example of non-financial incentives to 
help companies implement new regulations in Canada is a series of guidance documents by 
CICA, specifically targeted to managers, directors, and small businesses. Some financial relief 
associated with duplicate compliance requirements is provided to Canadian companies 
complying with SOX, as they may file U S documents with Canadian regulators. Penalties, as 
negative incentives, are intended to promote compliance by imposing significant negative' 
financial consequences or threat of imprisonment for non-compliance. Such "heavy-handed" 
methods are more characteristic of the command-and-control strategy than the incentives-based 
strategy. Neither country provides financial rewards to help implement regulations and to 
encourage compliance. Most companies have, at significant cost, used services of consulting 
companies to implement the necessary regulatory requirements. The financial burden has been 
relatively heavier on smaller companies than larger ones.19 A theoretical alternative would have 
been to Provide some financial relief to companies in the form of tax credits or rebates (Baldwin 
1 T I Q ^ ^ • Therefore, the use of incentives-based regulation is considered to be minimal in 
the US and minimal-moderate in Canada. 
It should be noted that no single strategy is clearly better than the others, and no optimum 
ot 6fferen,'!« T T ^ t 8 SPedf'C Strengths and ^ k n esses, from the perspectives 
of different stakeholders, whtch must be carefully balanced by regulators As a resuli 
o 7 v Z Z S,ra,eg'eS maY a' S°, "e US6d F ° r e x a m P ' e - self-regulLr, may be W e d and 
only ,f,, fails, government regulation or oversight implemented. Baldwin and Cave ,19991 
referred to this strategy as enforced self-regulation. This explanation provides a reasonabk 
invo v ng tnron and WorldCom, and implies a loss of confidence in if not a failure of the self-
regulating accounting profession (Davis, 2003-2004). Historically, the Secures Actlbs 
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Congress, 1933) and the Securities Exchange Act (US Congress, 1934) were also enacted after 
the stock market crash during economic depression. The Canadian regulatory system may also be 
considered as enforced self-regulation, as extensive standard-setting authority remains in the 
hands of the accounting profession, but subject to oversight by the Canadian Public 
Accountability Board (CPAB), the Accounting Standards Oversight Council (AcSOC), and the 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Oversight Council (AASOC). 
In summary, significant differences in accounting regulation strategies exist in Canada and the 
US. These findings may be surprising, considering that these two democratic neighbouring 
countries are fundamentally similar in terms of history, language, and culture. However, it has 
been argued that differences in capital markets and corporate governance structures in Canada 
warrant different strategies. These differences were described, for example, by Davis (2003-
2004). A large number of Canadian corporations are smaller than typical U S corporations and 
more closely held by single shareholders or small groups of shareholders, and many companies 
also hold shares of other companies. In addition, there can also be significant interrelationships 
among members of Boards of Directors, as the same individuals often serve on several boards. 
Consequently, the shareholders of Canadian companies may not be affected by information 
asymmetry arising from the separation of ownership and control to the same extent as 
shareholders of large widely-held U S corporations. 
Conclusion 
This paper reviews major differences between the US and Canadian accounting regulatory 
systems, in particular requirements for internal control over financial reporting stipulated in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (US Congress, 2002) and Canadian requirements in a series of 
Multilateral Instruments (MI) (Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 
2005d, 2006), as well as implications for the major players. Although some significant 
similarities between the Canadian and U S regulatory systems and strategies exist, marked 
differences are also evident. This finding may be surprising, given the physical proximity and 
similarities in history, language, and culture between the two countries. 
In Canada, both legislation for and oversight of internal control over financial reporting are more 
diverse and decentralized than in the US. In the U S , the key piece of legislation is the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002), whereas such legislation in Canada is under provincial jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) has been able to facilitate an 
agreement among all provinces, as stipulated in Multilateral Instrument (MI) 52-109 (CSA, 
2007b), which has recently been ratified in all Canadian provinces. In the US, the main oversight 
body is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ( P C A O B ) created by SOX. In Canada, 
oversight functions are not centralized, but they are handled by several agencies, such as the 
Accounting Standards Oversight Council (AcSOC), Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Oversight Council ( A A S O C ) , and Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB). The diverse 
regulatory system and the more consultative processes in Canada have resulted in somewhat 
weaker regulation and slower implementation processes. 
Both SOX and MI 52-109 regulate responsibilities of management, auditors, and Boards of 
Directors for internal control over financial reporting, but there are also significant differences. 
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They set out requirements relating to the audit committee's responsibilities, but S O X also 
specifically prohibits officers and directors from acting improperly in order to influence audits. 
Both the Canadian and U S requirements call for management certification of internal control 
with a major difference being that, according to S O X , the external auditor must also audit and 
certify management's internal control assessments. Without the auditor attestation requirement in 
Canadian companies, there is an increased onus on management to detect and report on material 
control weaknesses. In addition, S O X requires public companies to include management's 
internal control assessment reports with their annual reports, whereas M I 52-109 allows 
reporting as part of management discussion analysis ( M D & A ) in financial statements. S O X 
stipulates many auditor independence and professional conduct requirements that are not set out 
in M I 52-109 in Canada, but that are governed by C I C A in their professional conduct and 
auditing standards. 
Although Canadian requirements have been modelled after US law, and the core requirements 
for internal control over financial reporting are very similar, several major differences exist as to 
regulatory authority and strategies. The Canadian regulatory system relies heavily on both 
professional and legislative approaches and is generally based on broad principles, whereas the 
U S system is more centralized and rules-based with key powers concentrated in the hands of 
SEC and P C A O B . C I C A and its boards play key roles in both the standard-setting and oversight 
functions in Canada. Even on the legislative front, a great deal of voluntary provincial 
collaboration and consensus is necessary among the provinces in order to enact uniform 
provincial law. As compared with the U S approach, the Canadian approach results in greater 
influence by the accounting profession in standard setting and greater responsibility of 
management for ensuring the effectiveness of internal control. However, the standards and 
processes are still evolving and subject to ongoing refinement, and possibly increased 
requirements, as more experience is acquired. A s concluded by Kuras (2003-2004, p. 476), 
Canada has a unique challenge "to create securities regulation reform that reflects Canadian 
values and principles, yet which facilitates access to the capital markets of the United States in 
the post Sarbanes-Oxley era". These findings cast some doubt on the validity of the assumptions 
inherent in the Anglo-American and continental models of accounting regulation, and even in a 
uniform North American model. It appears that accounting regulation and strategies are 
influenced by the existing political and institutional structures of each country, and that, even if 
modelled after another country's practices, they must be adapted to fit the specific context of the 
adopting country. 
This paper contributes to the accounting literature and practice by highlighting that different 
approaches have been used, and are useful, in setting accounting regulation and standards in 
jurisdictions with different political, legal, and social environments. These experiences can help 
other jurisdictions in implementing and improving their regulations, systems, and processes, as 
well as aid academics in refining theory in this relatively new and under-researched area Further 
theoretical and empirical studies are needed to investigate the characteristics, context and effects 
of accounting regulation in different jurisdictions. 
J 
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Table 1. Major Accounting Regulators in Canada and 
Characteristic 
Accounting 
Standard-Setting 
Agencies 
Legislative and 
Oversight 
Agencies 
Canada 
• Accounting Standards Board (AcSB), 
CICA: sets accounting and reporting 
standards for profit-oriented and non-
profit organizations 
• Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(AASB), CICA: sets auditing and 
assurance standards for all sectors 
• Public Sector Accounting Standards Board 
(PSAB), CICA: sets accounting and 
reporting standards for federal, provincial, 
territorial, and local governments and 
boards 
• Accounting Standards Oversight Council 
(AcSOC): oversees activities of AcSB 
and P S A B 
• Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Oversight Council (AASOC): oversees 
activities of A A S B 
• Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA): 
national body of provincial securities 
regulators promoting harmonized 
provincial securities regulations 
• Provincial Securities Commissions: 
administer and enforce securities 
legislation in their respective provinces 
• Canadian Public Accountability Board 
(CPAB): oversees auditing firms engaged 
in public company audits (e.g., inspects 
firms and imposes auditor independence 
and quality control rules) 
• Public Accountants Council (PAC): sets 
standards for public accounting in 
Ontario and certifies that the three 
professional accounting bodies meet these 
standards 
US 
• Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB): establishes and improves 
financial accounting and reporting 
standards 
• Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB): establishes and improves 
financial accounting and reporting 
standards for state and local 
governments 
• Financial Accounting Standards Advisory 
Council (FASAC): advises F A S B on 
technical issues, project priorities, task 
forces, and other matters 
• Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF): 
oversees and funds activities of F A S B 
and GASB, selects members of both 
Boards and their advisory councils 
• Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC): regulates and oversees securities 
markets in US, and enforces securities 
legislation, notably Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) (US Congress, 2002) (agreed to 
coordinate enforcement of Sec. 404 with 
P C A O B (SEC, 2007)) 
• Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), created under SOX: 
inspects and registers public accounting 
firms; establishes, adopts, or modifies 
auditing, quality control, ethics, 
independence, and other standards; 
enforces compliance with the Act, 
professional standards, and securities laws; 
investigates potential violations; imposes 
sanctions 
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Table 2. Major Differences in Canadian and U S Accounting Regulations 
Characteristic 
Legislation and 
Regulations 
Canada 
M I 52-109—Certification of Disclosure 
in Issuer's Annual and Interim Filings 
(CSA, 2004a, 2005d, 2006, 2007a) 
M I 52-110—Audit Committees (CSA, 
2004b, 2005a) 
N P 58-201—Corporate Governance 
Guidelines (CSA, 2005b) 
US 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (US Congress, 
2002) 
Auditing Standard No. 2 Q^CAOB, 2004) 
Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB, 2007) 
Applicability 
Effective Dates 
All publicly listed Canadian companies, 
except investment funds and companies 
that comply with similar S O X regulations 
(Sec. 302) 
Control "design" certification by 
management applies for fiscal years 
ending after June 29, 2006 
Control "effectiveness" certification by 
management postponed, with proposed 
applicability for fiscal years ending after 
June 29, 2008 (CSA, 2007a) 
All U S public companies, their foreign 
subsidiaries, and foreign companies listed on 
U S stock exchanges 
Reporting on 
Internal Control 
Reporting can be done as part of 
management discussion and analysis 
( M D & A ) in financial statements 
Large U S companies (accelerated): 
management and auditor certification 
requirements for fiscal years ending after 
November 14, 2004 (SEC, 2006) 
Large foreign companies (accelerated): 
fiscal years ending after July 14, 2006 for 
management certification, and July 14, 2006 
or July 14, 2007 for auditor certification 
(SEC, 2006) 
All small companies (non-accelerated): 
fiscal years ending after December 14, 2007 
for management certification and December 
14, 2008 for auditor certification (SEC, 2006) 
Periodic reports must contain management's 
internal control reports (SOX, Sec. 302; Sec. 
404) 
Note- 1For S O X two main categories of filers exist: accelerated and non-accelerated. Accelerated filers have market 
value of common equity of at least $75 million, and non-accelerated filers less than this amount. For some purposes, 
for example for foreign companies, large accelerated filers with market value of at least $700 million are 
distinguished from other accelerated filers, with the latter allowed an extra year to comply with the auditor 
certification requirements (SEC, 2006). 
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Table 3. Major Differences in Responsibihties of Boards of Directors, Management, and Auditors 
Party 
Board and Audit 
Committee 
Management 
Auditor 
Canada 
Audit committee's responsibihties (MI 52-
110): 
• Recommending external auditor to Board 
and overseeing external auditor 
• Reviewing financial statements, M D & A , 
and annual and interim earnings press 
releases before their publication 
• Establishing procedures for handling 
anonymous complaints on accounting, 
internal control, and auditing matters 
• Approving hiring policies regarding 
current and former partners and employees 
of current and former auditors 
Board's responsibilities (NP 58-201): 
• Ensuring integrity of chief officers and 
culture of integrity throughout company 
• Identifying principal risks and ensuring 
appropriate systems to manage them 
C E O and C F O must certify that (MI 52-
109): 
• Financial statements and reports do not 
contain material misstatements and 
omissions, and that they fairly present 
company's financial condition 
• They are responsible for designing, 
establishing, and maintaining disclosure 
control and internal control over 
financial reporting (DC and ICFR) 
• They have designed D C and ICFR 
• They have evaluated effectiveness of 
D C and ICFR and reported conclusions 
of their assessments as part of M D & A 
• They have reported any changes in D C 
and ICFR that have materially affected, 
or are reasonably likely to materially 
affect, D C and ICFR 
Certification of management's internal 
control assessments by external auditor 
not required (CSA, 2005c, 2006) 
Assurance Handbook (Sec. 5751) 
provides standards for auditor 
communication with oversight bodies 
Assurance Handbook (Sec. 9110), 
effective May 1, 2007, addresses ' 
auditor's responsibihties in conducting 
reviews on internal control over 
financial reporting and form and content 
of such reports 
US 
Audit committee's responsibilities: 
• Selecting, compensating, retaining, and 
overseeing independent audit firm 
• Establishing procedures for handling 
confidential and anonymous complaints 
regarding accounting, internal control, and 
auditing matters by employees and others 
(Sec. 301) 
• Pre-approving all audit and non-audit 
services provided to company by auditor, and 
disclosing any pre-approval policies and 
audit services and fees (Sec. 202) 
C E O and C F O must certify that (SOX, Sec. 
302, Sec. 404): 
• Periodic reports filed do not contain material 
misstatements or omissions, so as to be 
misleading 
• They are responsible for establishing and 
maintaining disclosure control and 
procedures and internal control over 
financial reporting (DC and ICFR) 
• They have designed and evaluated 
effectiveness of D C and ICFR 
• They have reported conclusions on 
effectiveness of D C and ICFR 
• They have disclosed to external auditor and 
audit committee significant deficiencies in 
design and operation of D C and ICFR and 
any fraud by management or employees 
• They have reported any significant changes 
in D C and ICFR or other factors that could 
subsequently significantly affect D C and 
ICFR 
External auditor must attest to, and report 
on, internal control assessment made by 
management (SOX, Sec. 404) 
Before issuing audit report, external auditor 
must communicate to audit committee 
critical accounting policies, alternative 
accounting treatments and their impact 
discussed with management, and treatment 
preferred by auditor (SOX, Sec. 204) 
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Table 4. Major Differences in Use of Accounting Regulation Strategies in Canada and the U S 
Regulatory 
Strategy1 
Command-
and-Control 
Self-
Regulation 
Disclosure 
Regulation 
Incentives-
Based 
Regulation 
Canada 
Extent of Use 
MODERATE 
EXTENSIVE 
MODERATE 
MINIMAL-
MODERATE 
Examples 
• C S A national facilitator 
of securities market 
regulation 
• Provincial securities 
legislation and 
enforcement 
• Offences and penalties 
set out in provincial 
legislation and enforced 
by provincial securities 
commissions 
• Audit committee 
oversees external auditor 
• Auditing standards 
primarily principles-
based 
• C I C A primarily 
responsible for auditing 
and professional conduct 
standards 
• Accountants heavily 
represented on standards 
oversight councils and 
C P A B 
• Corporate governance 
practices 
• Qualifications and 
independence of audit 
committee members 
• Management's internal 
control assessments 
• C I C A guidance 
documents on internal 
control certification 
• Relief from Canadian 
regulations for 
companies complying 
with S O X 
• Some penalties as 
negative incentives 
US 
Extent of Use 
EXTENSIVE 
MODERATE 
MODERATE-
EXTENSIVE 
MINIMAL 
Examples 
• Sweeping centralized powers 
of SEC and P C A O B to 
regulate securities markets, 
auditing standards, and 
accounting profession 
• Severe penalties and personal 
liability by executives for 
non-compliance and fraud 
• Audit committee oversees 
external auditor 
• Auditing standards primarily 
rules-based 
• Accounting firms must 
register with P C A O B 
• Code of ethics 
• Financial expertise of audit 
committee members 
• Non-audit services 
• Management's internal 
control assessments 
• Auditor certification of 
management's internal 
control assessments 
• Severe penalties as negative 
incentives 
Note: 'The strategies are adapted from R. Baldwin and M . Cave (1999). Understanding Regulati, 
Strategy, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 58-62. 
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Endnotes 
. • A ^ int for the last half-century has been whether the Federal Government would also have the 
H
°
W ? '"«Z S L n S s" cuntt* r g S o r unTe^the Constitution Act. The prevailing view is that the Federal 
power to set up a national securities regulate- ^ ^ ^ ^
 w h l c h 
SrSlStSSTS ri OSSSKL and the establishment of a single Canadian Secunties 
Commission (Cox, 2004). 
:
 Puxty, WillmotL Cooper, and Lowe (1987) referred to them as market, state, and community. 
3
 Baldwin and Cave (1999) labelled economic-based theories as private interest theories and includedpublic choice 
and capture theones in this group. Public choice theones "stress the extent to w M c h governmental behaviour can be 
understood by viewing all actors as rational individual maximizers of their o w n welfare (Baldwin ancI Cave, 1999, 
p 22). Capture theories recognize the possibility of "the pursuit of the regulated enterprises interests [by the 
regulator] rather than those of the public at large" (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p. 36). 
4
 "A public good is a good such that consumption by one person does not destroy it for use by another" (Scott, 2006, 
p. 143). 
5
 Capture theorists warn of the danger that regulators may over time become more protective of the interests of those 
being regulated than public interests. Therefore, regulatory agencies themselves should be required to demonstrate 
accountability to some higher-level oversight agency or legislator to maintain their objectivity (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999). 
6
 The term 'true and fair' refers to the need for judgment in making financial statements useful for investment 
decisions, as opposed to ensuring that they comply with legislation (Wolk et al., 2001). 
7
 Puxty et al. (1987) provided an alternative model of accounting regulation and classified predominant regulation 
styles as being driven by market, state, or community (profession). They characterized accounting regulation in the 
U K as being primarily community-driven, in Germany state-driven, and in the U S as a mixture of the three styles. 
However, they noted a convergence towards state (central government) control in both the U K and the US. 
8
 However, harmonization of accounting regulation and standards is a complex issue beyond the scope of this paper. 
For example, in North America a multi-jurisdictional disclosure system (MJDS) adopted in Canada and the U S in 
1991 allows the SEC to accept some Canadian disclosure documents filed by eligible Canadian companies and vice 
versa (Kuras. 2003-2004), and the new Canadian securities regulations have been modelled after the U S regulations. 
In Europe, the European Union (EU) is also in the process of implementing similar securities regulations. At the 
international level, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) promotes harmonization of 
securities regulations among its members. As to accounting standards, the E U and many countries, including 
Canada, have voluntarily adopted or made commitments to adopt international accounting standards developed by 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Given diverse institutions, systems, and political 
environments in different countries, complete harmonization is not possible, and it has been described as a process 
rather than an outcome or state (Uddin, 2005; Tay and Parker, 1990), and as means to achieving some social goals 
instead of being an end in itself (Leebron, 1996). Furthermore, Leebron (1996) identified four possible levels of 
harmonization: specific rules, policy objectives, principles, and institutional structures and procedures. 
9
 In addition, the states have their own securities laws, called "blue sky" laws, which can vary somewhat from state 
to state, and which historically have had significant duplication with federal laws. The National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act (US Congress, 1996) removed some state duplication of registration requirements for many 
secunties and gave additional powers to SEC, but state regulation remains pertinent in many areas, particularly, 
investment advisors and fraud litigation. 
10
 For example, the Ontario Secunties Act (Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 1990) governs registration for and 
trading in secunties, continuous disclosure, insider trading, enforcement, and civil liability. 
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"Provincial secunties commissions administer and enforce securities legislation in their respective provinces In 
addition, some authonty over secunties regulation has been delegated to self-regulatory organization! such a s ock 
exchanges and the Investment Dealer, Association (IDA) (Cox, 2004). For exalte, s T o c S S n g e " Z estabhsh 
trading rules and penalties, mcludmg delisting of companies; and IDA monitors its investment dealer members for 
both therr capital adequacy and conduct of business. 
12
 Companies subject to SOX must file certificates signed by the CEO and CFO through the System for Electronic 
Document Analysis and Retneval (SEDAR), which is the official filing system for reports required by the Canadian 
Securities Administrators (CSA), as soon as reasonably practicable after they have been filed with SEC (CSA 
2006). 
13
 It is also noteworthy that a constitutional challenge had been launched in the US. In March 2007, a US federal 
judge dismissed a lawsuit filed by a small audit firm challenging the constitutionality of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board ( P C A O B ) and S O X (WebCPA, 2007). 
14
 The Assurance Handbook, Section 9110, paragraph .02 (CICA, 2007) states: "The purpose of such an engagement 
is solely to assist those charged with governance, those having oversight responsibility for the financial reporting 
process, or management in assessing the design, implementation or operating effectiveness of the entity's internal 
control over financial reporting. The public accountant reports the results of the agreed-upon procedures without 
providing assurance or an opinion on the design, implementation or operating effectiveness of the entity's internal 
control over financial reporting". 
15
 Disclosure control and internal control over financial reporting are defined in MI 52-109 (CSA, 2004a) and 
Sections 302 and 404 of S O X . Disclosure control comprises controls and other procedures intended to provide 
reasonable assurance that information required to be disclosed by securities law is accumulated and communicated 
to company's C E O and C F O to allow them to make timely decisions regarding appropriate disclosures. Internal 
control over financial reporting comprises processes and procedures designed and implemented by management, 
staff, and Board of Directors intended to provide reasonable assurance regarding reliability of financial statements 
and reports and their compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). They include procedures 
for maintenance of accurate, detailed, and timely records; proper authorization of receipts and expenditures by 
management and directors; and prevention or timely detection of unauthorized material transactions. 
16
 Although audit committees have been established and regulated as major corporate governance mechanisms in 
many countries, Turley and Z a m a n (2004) concluded that there currently is no clear evidence on how they influence 
organizational behaviours and achieve particular governance objectives. 
17
 For example, the Ontario Securities Act (Ontario Legislative Assembly, 1990) has continuous disclosure 
requirements for annual and interim financial information, and penalties applicable to directors and officers who 
have made, authorized, or permitted materially misleading statements and documents. 
18
 For example, Section 127(1)(2) of the Ontario Securities Act authorizes the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) 
to impose administrative sanctions, such as cease trade orders. 
19
 A survey by CRA International (2006) revealed that larger companies spent an average total of US $13,280,000 
(0.08 percent of revenues) and smaller companies U S $2,101,000 (0.3 percent of revenues) over the first two years 
of S O X Section 404 implementation. It noted, however, that the annual costs for the second year declined 
significantly due to learning, efficiencies, and reduced use of consultants. 
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